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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UNIVERSITY CLUB, a non-profit
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
INVESCO I-IOLDING CORPORATION, a New York corporation, and
WASATCH REALTY CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

Case No.
12792

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This action arose out of a breakdown of an air
conditioning system in a building wherein PlaintiffAppellant was lessee and Defendants-Respondents
Were lessors. Plaintiff-Appellant commenced this action
lo recover damages for breach of the lease agreement;
obtain reimbursement in accordance with the lease
agreement; recover damages for negligence on the part
of the lessor; and, obtain reimbursement by reason of
Defendants-Respondents' unjust enrichment.
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DISPOSITION IN TlIE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the motion of DefendantsRespondents for summary judgment.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGI-IT
ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment rendered by the lower court.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as
and 136 East South Temple, Inc., a Utah
corporation, entered into a lease agreement dated No·
vember 7, 1963, wherein the Club leased the top two
floors of a building then to be erected at 136 East
South Temple (the building is now commonly known
as the University Club Building). A copy of the Lease
is found at R. 43. The lease was later amended on Oc·
tober 1, 1967, but said amendment has no particular
significance with regard to the issues involved in this
appeal (R. 62). (The lease and the October 1967
amendment are hereinafter referred to as "Lease").
Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter referred to as
"Lessor") subsequently acquired all rights and assumed
all obligations of the Lease.
The Club used the premises to conduct the busi·
ness of operating a private club. This business opera·
tion consisted mainly of providing facilities for the
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comfort and relaxation of its members (R. 80). An important part of the operations of the Club is the service
of food and providing a place for meetings and parties
for organizations with which members are affiliated.
Jn the hot summer months of 1969, and more
particularly on July 18, 1969, the air conditioning
system in the building became totally inoperable (R.
80) . The breakdown of the system rendered the portion
of the building occupied by the Club unsuitable for
conducting its business opera ti on ( R. 80) . The walls
surrounding the floors occupied by the Club consisted
mainly of glass which provided little insulation from
the heat of the sun (R. 64). Moreover, the windows
were designed so that they would not open and thus
there was no air circulation whatsoever (R. 64). During the time the system was inoperable, the temperature,
on the premises averaged 103° F. during the afternoon
hours (R. 80).
The breakdown of the air conditioning system occurred by reason of faulty maintenance (R. 17-18).
Proper maintenance was the duty of Lessor (R. 50-51).
The breakdown did not involve any wrongdoing
on the part of the Club or any of its agents and employees ( R. 34-35 ; R. 17-18; Miller deposition, p. 1921). The namage which caused the breakdown was so
extensi,·e that the unit had to be replaced ( R. 80; Miller
deposition, p. 33).
The obligations of the lease which are relevant to
the issues involved in this appeal are as follows:
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QUIET ENJOYlUENT. Lessor
agrees that Lessee . . . shall peaceably and
quietly have, hold and enjoy the premises for
the full term of this Lease. (R. 47).
"IO.

16. UTILITIES. Lessor shall furnish
at its expense . . . air conditioning for the
premises and shall maintain a comfortable
temperature therein at all times .... (R. 49).

REP AIRS. Lessor shall maintain
and keep in good repair all portions of the
building . . . including . . . all machinery and
equipment provided for the use of the entire
· b u i 1 di n g such as . . . air conditioning.
Neither Lessor nor Lessee shall be liable to
the other for any damages sustained to the
property of the other resulting from the failure of either to make any repairs required to
be made hereunder, except that the one failing
to make such repairs shall be liable to the one
suffering such damage if the latter has given
written notice to the former of the need for
such repairs and the former has failed to make
the same with due diligence. If by reason of
making of repairs required to be made by
Lessor hereunder, Lessee is deprived of the
use or benefit of all or a substantial part of
the premises, rent shall be abated or reduced
according to the extent to which Lessee is deprived of such use or benefit (R. 50-51).
19.
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20. DAl\'.IAGE OR DESTRUCTION.

If the demised premises, or the building of
which the demised premises are to be a part,
is destroyed or damaged, Lessor agrees to replace or repair the same with reasonable
promptness and dispatch, and to allow Lessee
an abatement in the rent for such time as the
leased premises are untenantable or proportionately for such portion of the leased premises
as shall be untenantable, and the parties covenant and agree that the terms of this lease
shall not be otherwise affected (R. 51).

29. U N P E R F 0 R 1\1 E D COVEN ANTS OF LESSOR. If, after Lessee
has occupied the premises, Lessor fails to make
any repairs or do any work required of Lessor
by the provisions of this Lease, or in any other
respect fails to perform any of the covenants,
terms or conditions of this Lease to be performed by Lessor and such defa ult continues
for a period of thirty (30) days after written
demand for performance is given by Lessee,
then and in any of such events, Lessee may
make such payments and cure such defaults
on behalf of Lessor and, in connection therewith, do all work and make all payments
deemed necessary by Lessee, including costs
and charges in connection with any legal
action which have been commenced or threat-
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ened. Lessor agrees to reimburse Lessee upon
demand the amounts so paid by Lessee, together with interest thereon at the rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum .and, regardless of
who may own Lessor's interest in this Lease
at the time, Lessee may withhold all payments
of rent or other sums then or thereafter due
Lessor until the amounts withheld equal the
amounts so paid by Lessee, with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed by Lessor.... " (R. 55-56).
At the time of the breakdown, representatives of
the Club immediately contacted representatives of
Lessor in an attempt to work out a plan where the air
conditioning system could be restored as soon as possible. The Club representatives were informed by rep·
resentatives of Lessor that the air conditioning service
could not be restored within the 30 day period specified
in paragraph 29 of the Lease; restoration of service
would involve two or three months (It. 80) .
The failure of the air conditioning system and the
resulting intolerable temperatures on the Club premises,
caused a complete cessation of business (R. 80). The
prospect of a prolonged shutdown of two to three
months threatened the good will and survival of the
Club and created an emergency situation which demand·
ed immediate solution (R. 80).
On July 22, 1969, the Club, through its president,
Frank C. Colladay, prepared and delivered a letter to
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Lessor notifying Lessor of the default and demanding
that the same be remedied (R. 64-65). The letter called
attention to the provisions of paragraph 29 of the Lease
wherein the Club had the right to cure the defect at the
expense of the Lessor and further noted that substantial damage would be incurred in the event of a prolonger period without air conditioning service (R. 65).
The parties joined efforts to remedy the problem
(R. 80-81; :Miller deposition, p. 13). The main emphasis of the joint effort was to locate another air conditioning unit sufficient to service the portion of the
building occupied by the Club (R. 80-81). All of these
efforts to locate a new unit were made contemporaneously with the discussion of the Club's right under paragraph 29 of the Lease (R. 81).
It was apparently acknowledged by both parties
that since more than 30 days would be required to replace the inoperative unit, the Club had the right to
purchase a new unit and thereby cure the Lessor's default in accordance with paragraph 29 of the Lease
(R. 80; .Miller deposition, p. 11-13). l\ir. Ronald Jefferies, an officer of Lessor, informed the Club of the
availability of an air conditioning unit adequate to cool
the premises occupied by the Club (R. 80). Representatives of the Club investigated the information and
learned that such unit was in fact available, but that
it had to be immediately purchased (R. 80-81). The
failure of an immediate purchase would result in a further delay of 30 days. The Club wa.s therefore in a
position where it was required to act immediately or
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take the risk of irresparable loss that may result from
the Lessor's breach of the Lease ( R. 80-81). After the
Club had sent communications wherein it had stated
its position as to the responsibility for curing the breach
and pursuant to the combined efforts of the Club and
Lessor, the Club purchased the available unit and arranged for its installation ( R. 79-82).
"\Vith complete knowledge of the precarious position in which the Club had been placed by the Lessor's
breach of the lease, and with full realization of the pur·
chase of the replacement unit pursuant to the joint
efforts of the parties, representative:) of Lessor called
a meeting for July 23, 1969 (R. 81; :Miller deposition,
p. 8). The meeting was attended by lVIarion .Miller
(Lessor's building manager), .Mr. Ronald Jefferies
(an officer of Lessor who was visiting from out of
state), Frank C. Colladay (the Club president), Tad
Bullen (the Club manager), and Ray 'Villey (a mem·
her of the Club ( l\Iiller deposition, pp. 7-9).
Prior to the meeting, Lessor empJoyed its attorney
to prepare a letter agreement ( l\iiller deposition, pp. 7,
9; R. 81) wherein it was stated that the Club would pur·
chase the available air conditioning unit and waive all
rights for reimbursement under the paragraph 29 of the
Lease! (A copy of the letter may be found at R. 66).
There was no advance notice of this proposal; the letter
agreement was first presented at the opening of the
meeting (R. 81; Miller deposition, p. 10). Lessor stated
that unless the letter agreement was signed by the Club,

9

the Lessor would not allow space for installation of the
new unit (R. 81).
Since no notice of the proposed agreement had
been given to the Club representatives, the Club had
not employed an attorney to be present to examine the
document.
Despite the precarious position of the Club and the
emergency circumstances existing at the time of the
meeting on July 23, 1969, the representatives of the
Club refused to agree to waive their reimbursement
rights of paragraph 29 of the Lease (R. 81). After
some discussion, the parties agreed to add a clause reserving all of the Club's rights under the Lease (R. 81).
The following paragraph was added at the bottom of
the second page of the Jetter agreement:

"It is mutually understood and agreed that

this letter does not waive any of the rights or
covenants entitled to by the Lessee under its
lease agreements for the premises leased in the
University Club Building." (R. 67).

Several times during the course of the meeting,
the representatives of Lessor stated that they had no
intention whatsoever of in any manner altering or
amending any terms of the lease or waiving the Club's
rights under the Lease (R. 81-82; M.iller deposition,
pp. 11-13).
The presentation of the letter was made without
any previous notice of the content of the letter or the
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proposal therein contained ( R. 80) . The timing of the
letter is very significant to the case in that it was presented after the Club had already committed itself to
purchase the new unit and arrange for its installation
(R. 81). There was nothing which prevented Lessor
from presenting the letter prior to the time the Club
had committed itself to the purchase and installation
of the new unit (l\Iiller deposition, p. 15).
After reaching the agreement stated in the addendum above quoted and with knowledge of the Club's
representations that no amendment or waiver was intended by the letter of July 23, the Club had the new
air conditioning unit installed. The purchase price and
installation costs of the unit amounted to in excess of
$16,000 (R. 18). Subsequently, the Club demanded reimbursement pursuant to its rights under paragraph 29
of the Lease, but the Lessor refused, claiming that the
Lease had been amended and that all obligation of the
Lessor had been waived by the letter which had been
signed at the meeting.
This action was then instituted to recover damages
for the Lessor's breach of paragraphs 10, 16, and 19
of the Lease; for reimbursement pursnm·t to paragraph
29 of the Lease of monies expended by tl:e Club in curing the Lessor's defect by the purchase of the air conditioning unit; for negligence on the part •f the Lessor
in causing damage to the Club; and for m just enrich·
ment of the Lessor arising out of the perf )r:nance by
the Club of the Lessor's obligation under p.11 agraphs
1
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10, 16, and 19 of the Lease. Lessor responded by assert-

ing that the Club had waived all of its rights under the
Lease by reason of the letter agreement above referred
to, and claimed further that paragraph 19 of the Lease
precluded recovery and that paragraph 20 of the Lease
constituted an exclusive remedy in such situations.

SUMMARY
There is no dispute over the fact that Lessor had
the obligation to provide and maintain air conditioning
on the premises. There is no dispute over the fact that
Lessor breached this obligation when the air conditioning system failed on July 18, 1969.
The controversy arises out of the Lessor's claim
that: (a) The Club is not entitled to damages for the
breach because its exclusive remedy under the Lease is
rent abatement; ( b) the Club is not entitled to damages
by reason of the breach because the Lease exculpates
Lessor of all liability for any breach arising by failure
of the Lessor to make repairs; ( c) the Club is not entitled to reimbursement for curing Lessor's breach of
the Lease because the Club did not wait 30 days before
curing said default and the Club waived its rights by
signing a letter agreement of July 23, 1969.
There is no provision in the Lease which limits the
Club's remedy to rent abatement. The Lease merely allows the Lessor to elect rent abatement among other
remedies available at law.
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The exculpatory provisions of the Lease can be imposed only after certain factual issues are resolved. The
summary judgment ignores these factual disputes. The
exculpatory provisions do not <;onstitute a blanket re·
lease from damages arising from any and breaches of
the Lease contract. The Lease provisions are not broad
enough to release Lessor from liability for damages in
this case.

Even if the Club were limited to rent abatement,
and even if the Lessor were released of all damages
arising out of the breach of the Lease, paragraph 29 ,
of the Lease specifically provides for the Club's re·
imbursement for curing the Lessor's breach.

There is no dispute that paragraph 29 provides for
reimbursement regardless of the effect of other provi·
sions of the Lease. There is no dispute over the fact
that the Club complied with the written notice provi·
sions of the Lease. The dispute centers in the Lessor's ,
claim that the Club should have waited 30 days before ,
curing the Lessor's default and that paragraph 29 was
amended by a purported letter agreement of July 28, '
1969.

The law is clear that the Club was not required to
wait the 30-day period when the Lessor acknowledged
that it could not make the necessary repairs within the
30-day period specified in paragraph 29.
The claimed letter agreement of July 23, 1969, was ,
not intended by either of the parties to amend the Lease
and did not amend the Lease. Even if the parties had
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intended the claimed agreement to amend the Lease,
there are factual issues which must be resolved before
th purported agreement can be given effect.
Regardless of the Lease provisions, the Lessor was
unjustly enriched by the Club's performance of the
Lessor's obligations under the Lease.

ARGU.MENT
POINT I
TI-IE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE CLUB'S EXCLUSIVE R E 1\1 E D Y IS RENT
ABATEl\iENT.
In granting Lessor's motion for summary judgment, the lower court held that the Club was not entitled to recover any of the items of damage suffered
by reason of the Lessor's breach of the Lease (damages
enumerated at R. 18) and that the Club's sole and exclusive remedy was rent abatement during the period
from July 18 (the date of the breakdown) to July 30
(the date of completion of the installation of the new
unit purchased by the Club).
The apparent hasis of this holding was the provisions of paragraphs 19 and 20 (quoted in the Statement of Facts). Such a holding imposes terms upon the
parties which are not contained in the Lease and constitutes an error in law.
Although paragraphs 19 and 20 provide for rent
abatement in the event of repairs which render the prem-
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ises partially or totally untenantable, there is no provision in the Lease that eYen suggests that such rent abatement is to be the c.rclusivc remedy.
The law is clear that when a landlord breaches a
covenant to repair, the tenant is entitled to recoYer all
foreseeable damages which are sustained by reason of
the breach. TVolf c v. TVhitc, 119 Utah 183, 225 P.2d 729
( 1950). The overwhelming weight of authority holds
that the measure of damages for a breach of a Lessor's
CO\'<'n'mt to repair is all damages that "are the direct,
natural, :rnd proximate result of the breach, and such
as u.<ty i easo11ah1y be supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the time they made the
contract." Pappas v. Zcru.:oodis, 153 P. 2d 170 ("\Vash.
1944) . This includes loss of profit: TV olf e v. TVhite,
supra; Paul v. Carndcn Jlotor Co., 255 S."\\T. 2d 418
(Ark. 19;33); Rosen v. l'•lcedelman, 83 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
1955); Duthie v. Haas, 232 P. 2d 971(Ida.1951);
II argis v. Sample, 306 S."\V. 2d 564 (l\Io. 1957);
Pappas v. Zerwoodis, 153 P. 2d 170 (Wash. }!)44);
Loss of use of premises: Theobald v. JI eilman, 92 S.W.
2d 802 (Ky. 1936); and reimbursement for curing the
default: Beardsley v. nlorrison, 18 Utah 478, 56 Pac.
303 (1899); Rene's Restaurant Corp. v. Fro-Du-Co.
Corp., 210 N.E. 2d 385 (Ind. 1965); Dlarini v. Ireland,
265 At. 2d 526 (N.J. 1970).
However, the lower court held that the Club agreed
to waive all of these remedies by the mere mention of
rent abatement without any reference whatsover in the
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Lease that such ahatement was to constitute an exclusive
remedy, waiver or release.
The purpose of rent abatement is clear: if the
tenant is deprived of the use of all or a substantial part
of the premises, he should not pay the landlord because
usage is the essential element of the lease from the
tenant's point of view. This is particularly true where,
as here, the loss of use directly results from the action
or negligence of the landlord. But when a tenant bargains for and receives such a concession, he does not
thereby waive other remedies unless the lease specifically so provides.
A brief consideration of the law in Utah at the
time the Lease was drafted establishes that the purpose
of the rent abatement provisions of paragraphs 19 and
20 was not to restrict the Club's remedies. In lVarm
Springs Co. v. Salt Lalce City, 50 Utah 58, 165 Pac.
788 ( 1917), the plaintiff leased certain property from
the City. The lease provided that a portion of the property could be subleased for a saloon or bar. Subsequently the state passed a law that no bars or saloons could
be erected in areas designated by the City Council. The
Salt Lake City Council passed an ordinance prohibiting
a saloon in the area covered by the lease. The lessee retained the premises despite the passage of the ordinance,
but commenced this suit to obtain a recovery of a portion of the monthly rental which had been paid on the
premises. The basis of recovery was that the City
passed the ordinance and thus could not retain that portion of the rent which represented the value of the priv-
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ilege to construct a saloon. By reason of this partial
eviction, the plaintiff contended that it was entitled to
an abatement of a portion of the rent. This court rejected the plaintiff's contentioi:i that it was entitled to
any type of rent abatement. The stated basis of this
holding was as follows:
"If the plaintiff desired to protect itself
against the payment of rent in case the right
to maintain a bar on the premises should be
prohibited hy law, it should have provided for
that emergency in the lease."

It is apparent from the language above quoted

that the rent abatement provisions of the Lease in ques·
tion were inserted into the Lease pursuant to the law of
Utah which requires such provisions to avoid rent obligation in the event of untcnantability or eviction. The
rent abatement provisions, therefore, were intended to
supplement rather than to restrict the Club's remedies
in the event of partial or total untenantability. The laws
existing when an agreement is made <lfe presumed to
have been known by the parties and to have been in
mind at the time the contract was made. Alpha Beta
li'ood 111 arkets v. Retail Clerks Union, 291 P. 2d 433
(Cal. 1952). Accord, Yeazell v. Cavins, 402 P. 2d 541
(Ariz. 1965); City and Count11 of Honolulu v. Kam,
402 P. 2d 683 (IIawaii 1965); Nichols v. Cullaway, 193
P. 2d 294 (Okla. 1948); Fischler v. Nicklin, 319 P.2d
1098 (Wash. 1958); Application of Hagood, 356 P. 2d
135 (Wyo. 1960).
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The TY arrn Springs case is in agreement with the
overwhelming weight of authority which holds that the
lessor's covenant to make repairs is independent of the
tenant's covenant to pay rent; the obligation to pay rent
continues despite the lessor's breach of a duty to repair
unless the lease provides otherwise. Hutcherson v.
Lclitin, 313 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Calif. 1970) (applying California law); Ng v. Warren, 179 P. 2d 41
(Calif. App. 1947); Degrey v. Fox, 205 So. 2d 849
(La. 1968); Stone v. Sullivan, 15 N.E. 2d 476 (:Mass.
1938); Dittman v. JJicFadden. 15 P. 2d 139 (Okla.
1932); Cornmunity Theaters, Inc. v. TVeilbacher, 57
S.l'V. 2d 941 (Tex. 1933).
The Club has found no authority for the proposition that a provision for rent abatement during a period
of repairs will per se constitute the Jessee's exclusive
remedy. The only case dealing with the situation, Ng v.
TfTarrcn, 179 P. 2d 41 (Calif. App. 1947) states, by
way of dictum, that rent abatement and damages may
be recovered simultaneously.
The usual rule is that a contractual remedy exists
for the benefit of the party in whose favor the remedy
is given and such party may elect a contractual remedy
or his remedies at law. Treadway v. Western Cotton Oil
& Ginning Co., 10 P. 2d 371 (Ariz. 1932).
The lower court's holding that the rent the abatement provisions of paragraphs 19 and 20 constituted an
exclusive remedy is not supported by any provision of
the Lease and therefore should not be imposed upon the
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contracting parties. The law is clear that a contractual
provision or obligation "can arise only by necessary implication from specific language of the lease or because
it is in<lispensable to carrying into effect the purpose
of the lease." 11Iarirzi v. Ireland; 265 A. 2<l 526 (N.J.
1970) . A party to a contract "is bouncl only to the extent the terms expressly indicate, or at least fairly and
reasonable implied." Kidman v. 1Vhitc, 14 Utah 2d 142,
378 P. 2d 898 ( 1963). The imposition of an exclusive
remecly provision amounts to the lower court making n
new and different agreement not contemplated by the
parties.
Paragraph 20 of the Lease, which contains the rent
abatement provisions, specifically provides that despite
the provision for abatement during the period of repairs, "the terms of this Lease shall not be otherwise
affected" (R. 51). Thus, regardless of the provisions
for abatement during repairs, the obligation of Lessor
to "maintain a comfortable temperature therein at all
times," to "furnish at its expense ... air conditioning",
and to allow peaceable and quiet enjoyment of the premises remained in full force and effect.
If it \Vere to be assumed for the sake of argument
that the rent abatement provisions were ambiguous so
as to allow a reasonable interpretation that said provisions were intended to constitute an exclusive remedy,
the uncertainty and doubt thereby created should be
resolved against the Lessor. Estate of Corbin v. McKey
and Poaque, Inc., 245 N.E. 2d 117 (Ill. 1969). Clauses
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which purport to exculpate a party from a wrongdoing
are construed strictly against the party in whose favor
the exculpatory clause is drafted. Walker Banh: & Trust
Company v. First Securitv Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341
P. 2d 944 (1954); Estate of Corbin v. JJfcKe,y and
Poaque, supra.
The undisputed facts establish that the Club suffered substantial losses by reason of the Lessor's breach
of its duty to provide air conditioning and keep the
system in a good state of repair (R. 18). The Club
should not be precluded from recovery of these losses
by reason of an interpretation which is not supported by
the wording of the Lease and not intended by the
parties.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 19 RELEASED TI-IE LESSOR
J;'ROl\I ALL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO l\1AKE REP AIRS.
The summary judgment rendered by the lower
court denied the Club any recovery of the items of damage alleged in the complaint (specified at R. 18) and
thus apparently was based on a decision that paragraph
19 of the Lease released Lessor from all liability for
hreach of its duty to make repairs. Such a holding constitutes an error in law.
The provisions of paragraph 19 exculpate the
Lessor from liability for failure to make the repairs
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specified in saicl paragraph. There is no lallguagc purporting to exculpate Lessor for breach of the Lease for
failure to allow quiet enjoyment (Paragraph 10) or
failure to furnish air
at the Lessor's ex·
pense (Paragraph 16) or failure to maintain a comfort·
able temperature on the premises at all times (Para·
graph 16). The law is clear that an exculpatory clause
such as the one in paragraph 19 is to be strictly con·
strued against the Lessor and that such clauses do not
release the Lessor from liability for any breach not
specifically stated in said clause.
In Estate of Corbin vs. 1JicKcy and Poaque, Inc.,
245 N .E. 2d 117 (Ill. 1969), the lessor excluded the
executor of the deceased lessee from the premises sub·
sequent to the death of the lessee. Later the lessor sued
for rent payments from the time of death to the date
the premises were again rented. The estate contended
that the rent was abated during the period that entry
was refused by the lessor. In answer to the claim of
wrongful exclusion from the premises, the lessor noted
an exculpatory clause which specifically stated that the
lessor was not liable for damages which may arise by
reason of his failure to repair the premises, by reason
of a wrongful eviction, or by reason of "any act or
neglect of lessor".
The court held that the lessor could not rely upon
this exculpatory clause since said clause did not specific·
ally mention the conduct which the estate claimed as the
basis of its recovery. The basis of the holding was as
follows:
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. doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of
language in a lease is construed most strongly
against the lessor and in favor of the lessee
... exculpatory clauses are to he strictly construed against the party they benefit.
The court further noted that to release the lessor from
liability for an obvious and apparent breach of the lease
when such an act was not specifically included in the
exculpatory clause, would be "ludicrous and unconscionable".
Since the exculpatory provisions of paragraph 19
of the Lease in question do not specifically mention
Lessor's obligations as stated in paragraphs 10 and 16
of the Lease, and since the exculpatory provisions are
confined only to the obligation of the Lessor to make
repairs in accordance with paragraph 19, the Lessor cannot be released from liability for breaches of paragraphs
JO and 16.
Even if the provisions of paragraph 19 were broad
enough to cover all of the Lessor's obligations in other
paragraphs of the Lease, a summary judgment would
still be improper in this case. The provisions of paragraph 19 purport to release the Lessor from liability
only for damage to "property". Applying the strict
construction rule of the Estate of Corbin v. 'IJJcKey and
Poaque, Inc., supra, the "property" should be limited
to items normally contemplated as property, i.e., tangible items.
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The Club claims a substantial loss of profits (R
18) which should not he included in the term "property"
when strict construction against the Lessor is f
:Moreover, cases considering similar lease provisions have
held that the word "property" does not include loss of
profits.
In llargis v. Sample, 306 S.,,Y. 2d 564 (l\Io.
1957), the lessor had undertaken the duty to make repairs by specific provision in the lease. Subsequently
the lessor breached this contractual obligation. The
lessee commenced this suit to recover loss of profits
sustained by reason of the breach.
In defense of the lessee's claim, the lessor asserted
a provision of the lease which stated that "lessor shall
not be liable to said lessee or any other person ... for
any damage to their person or property caused by water,
. snow .... "
rain,
The court held that the term "property" in the
above quoted provision could not be construed to include
loss of profits. The basis of the decision was stated as
follows:

"'V ords used in a written lease are to be in-

terpreted according to their ordinary meaning .
unless they are defined by the instrument itself." Accord, Tl/ells vs. Jersey City, 207 F.
871 (1913), affirmed 219 F. 699 (1915), cert.
denied, 2H9 U.S. 650 {1916).
This Court has held that wording in a contract
must be construed in accordance with the "ordinary and
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usual meaning of the words used." Plain City Irrigation
Co. v. lloopcr Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.
2d G25 ( l 9GO).

By reason of the rule of strict construction, and by

reason of the rule that words are to be understood in
their ordinary usage, the provisions of paragraph 19, if
effective at all, do not constitute a release for loss of
profits and the dismissal of that claim was improper.
The complaint in this action specifically alleges
damages by reason of the negligence of the Lessor. The
summary judgment of the lower court dismissed this
negligence claim apparently on the basis of the exculpatory provisions of paragraph 19. Such dismissal is improper by reason of the Utah law, which requires that a
contractual provision purporting to release a party of
the consequences of his own negligence will not be given
effect unless the intent to make such release is stated
in "manifestly plain and unequivocal" language. Jf"alker
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d
215, 341 P. 2d 944 (1959); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P. 2d
910 (19G5); Titan Steel Corp. v. 1Valton, 365 F. 2d
542 (10th Cir. 1966). There is no language in paragraph 19 which in any manner suggests that the provisions in that paragraph released Lessor of the consequences of its own negligence.
Even if the exculpatory provisions of paragraph
19 were construed to cover the situation at hand, such
provisions cannot be enforced on a motion for summary
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judgment since there are issues of fact which must be
resolved before the paragraph can be applied. Para·
graph 19, by its own terms, will not release the Lessor
from liability for failure to make repairs if repairs are
not made "with due diligence" after receipt of written
notice. This raises a serious question of fact as to
whether Lessor can rely on paragraph 19.
Representatives of Lessor, after receiving notice of
the breakdown, stated that air conditioning could not
be restored for "two or three months" (R. 80), because
the unit had to be replaced ( .l\Iiller deposition, pp. 32·
33) . The replacement actually took six weeks ( l\Iiller
deposition, p. 33).
The long delay involved in restoring the service
was necessitated by reason of the fact that the replacement unit had to be custom made (:Miller deposition, p.
33). Of course, had the unit been repaired, rather than
replaced, the construction of the custom made replace·
ment would have been unnecessary. Apparently, the
repair of the unit (as opposed to replacement) was an
available opportunity to the Lessor, but was not pursued
because of an unspecified difference in cost (l\liller
deposition, pp. 32-33).
Thus, there is a serious question of fact as to
whether the delay of six weeks constituted "due dili·
gence" and whether the delay involved in the decision
to replace rather than to repair constituted "due dili·
gence". The Club was entitled to have these questions
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considered by a jury to assure that the application of
paragraph 19 was proper under the facts of the case.

POINT III
TIIE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE CLUB REil\IBURSEl\IENT FOR
CURING THE LESSOR'S DEF AULT
Lessor cannot seriously contend that the provisions
of paragraph 19 released it from the obligations under
paragraph 29 of the same Lease. l\Ioreover, there can
be no serious claim that the rent abatement provisions
of paragraphs 19 and 20 excluded the Club's remedy
under paragraph 29 of the same Lease. Therefore, regardless of the Court's decisions with regard to the interpretation of paragraphs 19 and 20, the Lease specifically states that in the event of a default by the
Lessor of any covenant of the Lease, the Club may
cure the default and obtain reimbursement for the expenses involved.
As previously stated, when the air conditioning
system failed, the Club gave the Lessor written notice
of the breakdown and specifically called the Lessor's
attention to the Club's rights under paragraph 29 (R.
64) . There was also oral notice and extended discussion
of the problem ( R. 80-81).
After receiving notice of the· breakdown, the representatives of Lessor clearly and unequivocally stated
that the air conditioning system could not be restored
within the 30-day period specified in paragraph 29 of
the Lease ( R. 80) . Using a hind-sight test, service was
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m fact not restored within the 30-day period specified
in paragraph 29 (.l\Iiller deposition, p. 33).
Since repairs could not he made within 30 clays, and
since this fact had been
by the Lessor,
the Club went ahead and exercised its rights under para·
graph 29 and cured the default by the purchase of a
replacement unit.
llowever, after expending substantial amounts in
curing the defa ult, the trial court denied the Club's
right to reimbursement on the ground that the Club was
obligated to wait for 30 days before curing the default.
This decision constituted an error in law.
Since the Lessor acknowledged that the replacement would not be made within 30 days, the Club was
authorized to act immediately in curing the default. The
law does not require the Club to actually wait for the
passage of the 30-day period when it is known and
acknowledged by all parties that the defa ult will still
be existing at the end of such period.
In Stanford Petroleum Co. v. Janssen, 116 Utah
352, 209 P. 2d 932 (1949), this Court stated that a
party need not adhere to a contractual provision after
being advised by the other contracting party that a de·
fault will occur regardless of performance. In the
course of the opinion this Court quoted with approval
the following language from the Restatement of Contracts, § 306:
"V\rhen failure of a party to a contract to perform a condition or a promise is induced by a
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manifestation to him by the other party that he
cannot or will not substantially perform his
own promise or that he doubts whether though
able, he will do so, the duty of such other party
becomes independent of performance of the
condition or promise ..
Comment A. No man is compelled to do a
useless act, and if performance of a condition
will not be followed by performance of the
promise which is conditional, it is useless for
the intended purpose and it is therefore unnecessary to perform the condition. A promisee
in judging whether performance of a condition
will not be followed by performance of the
promise is justified in taking the other party
at his word ... "
Although not quoted by this Court in the Stanford
Petroleum Co. case, .r;upra, Section 306 of the Restatement of Contracts contains the following example
which is helpful in disposing of the issues before this
Court:
"A, an insurance company provides in a policy
that is issued to B, that in case of loss no payment will be made unless notice is given within
60 days after loss, nor except after arbitration
as provided in the policy. A loss occurs. The
insurance company promptly learns of it, and
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for no adequate reason informs B that payment
will not be made. The condition of notice and
arbitration are excused."
The doctrine of anticipatory breach allows a party
to act immediately when the inevitability of a breach
is acknowledged by the other party to the contract. Jor·
dan v. nladscn, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570 (1926).
Therefore, the Club, upon being advised that the
default would not be cured within the 30-day period
specified in paragraph 29, did not act in violation of
the Lease in immediately curing the default.
The Lessor was immediately aware that the Club
intended on purchasing a unit prior to the 30 day period
specified in paragraph 29 and made no objection . .More·
over, the Lessor assisted the Club in making the pur·
chase prior to the 30 day period (R. 80). The first oh·
jection from Lessor was made after the unit had been
purchased and installed.
The lower court's denial of the Club's right" to re·
imbursement was also based on a decision that the pur·
ported letter agreement of July 23, 1969 (R. 66)
amounted to a waiver by the Club of its rights under
paragraph 29 of the Lease. The rationale which was
necessarily involved to arrive at this decision constituted
error.
An examination of the letter of July 23, 1969,
establishes that it is conflicting in its meaning. The body
of the letter purports to completely waive the Club's
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rights to reimbursement under paragraph 29 of the
Lease. I-Iowever, the addendum appearing at the end
of the letter, which is separately signed by the respective
parties, purports to completely reserve all of the Club's
rights under the Lease including paragraph 29.
By reason of the obvious conflict within the four
corners of the letter, parol evidence should have been
considered for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of
the parties and thereby determine the meaning of the
agreement:
"'Vhenever uncertaintly or ambiguity exists
with respect thereto, it is proper for the Court
to consider all of the facts and circumstances,
including the words and actions of the parties
forming the background of the transaction."
Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d 465
( 1957).
In addition to evidence as to the words and actions
of the parties, the Court should employ various rules
of construction to ascertain the intent of the parties.
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98,
306 P. 2d 773 (1957).
Extrinsic evidence was submitted to the lower court
in this case on the motion for summary judgment. This
evidence, together with the accepted rules of construction, establishes that the parties did not intend to amend
the Lease or waive the Club's rights to reimbursement
under paragraph 29 of the Lease. At the very least,
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this evidence raises a factual issue as to the intent of the
parties and such issue precludes the granting of a summary judgment in this matter.
The uncontroverted facts
that the Lessor
did not intend to amend the Lease by the letter of July
23rd. Note the following testimony of .Marion .Miller,
the building manager employed by Lessor (Miller
deposition, p. 4) who was present at the meeting when
the July 23rd letter was signed:
"Q.

(By J)Jr ..l\IcDonald) So l\Ir. Jefferies'
comment was that he stated that at least
it was his purpose not to in any way alter
or amend the Lease?

A.

I actually can't remember how this-bear
in mind I was a very new employee and
really wasn't aware of the conditions of
the lease and had never met with any of
these people before ..Mr. Jefferies had . .I
was totally in the dark.

Q.

Did l\Ir. Jefferies make a statement during the course of this meeting that it was
not his intent to alter or amend the lease?

k.

I couldn't say that under oath. I really
can't remember, but that was my impression. (Marion l\1iller deposition, pages
11-12} (emphasis added)
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Q.

But your impression of what his intent
was with this letter was based [sic], was
it not, on statements .Mr. Jefferies made
either to you or to others during the course
of this meeting or during the course of
your meeting with him?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Again, what were those impressions that
you had of his intent?

A.

As my memory serves me, I would assume
that .l\Ir. Jefferies first of all wasn't in a
position to go ahead and sanction any expense as far as the club installations were
concerned. I do feel that he was trying to
protect-not protect. That's the wrong
word. Trying to agree to anything that
was fair and amiable [sic] as far as assistance to the club during this very critical time to the building and to the club.

Q.

JV as it also your impression it was his intent that he did not want to alter or amend
the provisions of the lease?

A.

Oh, yes. (:Marion
(emphasis added)

deposition, p. 13)

It is apparent from this testimony that the stated
intent of the Lessor was not to in any way amend the
Lease and not to waive any rights under the Lease. The
affidavit of Tad Bullen, Manager of the Club, states
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that the Club did not intend nor understand that the
letter in any way amended the Lease ( R. 80-81). Since
both parties deny any intent to amend the Lease in any
respect, a finding that the conflicting provisions of the
letter had the effect of amending the Lease imposes
a result not intended by the parties.
A meeting of the minds is a necessary element to
a contract. Radley v. Smith, supra; Valcarce v. Bitters,
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427 ( 1961). It is apparent
from the testimony of :Marion l\1iller above quoted, together with the affidavit of Tad Bullen, which consti·
tute the only evidence with regard to the intent of the
parties, that there was no meeting of the minds to amend
paragraph 29 of the Lease. At the very least, a question
of fact exists with respect to the issue of whether a
meeting of the minds ever took place with regard to a
waiver or amendment of paragraph 29.
In addition to the clear expression of intent not to
amend the Lease, the rules of construction clearly
establish an intent that the Lease was not to be amended
by the July 23rd letter.
The letter was prepared by the attorney for the
Lessor ( l\1iller deposition, pp. 7-9). The attorney re·
ceived help from l\fr. Jefferies (.Miller deposition, P·
2 4) , a managerial agent for Lessor ( lUiller deposition,
p. 17). Mr. Jefferies also assisted in preparing the ad·
dendum appearing at the end of the letter, which pur·
ports to retain all provisions of the Lease (Miller depo·
sition, p. 24).
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It is well established that any doubt as to the meaning of an agreement must be resolved against the party
who prepared the agreement. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16
Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d 503 (1965); lJfaw v. Noble, 10
Utah 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121 (1960); Cantinental Banli:
& Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d
773 (1957); Huber and Rowland Construction Co. v.
City of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P.2d 258
(1958); Gregerson v. Equitable Life and Casualty Co.,
123 Utah 152, 256 P. 2d 566 (1953); Bryant v. De.iwret
News Publishing Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P. 2d 355
(1951) . Thus, the conflict between the addendum appearing at the end of the letter and the body of the letter should be resolved by giving effect to the addendum.
It is a well established rule of construction that as
between two possible interpretations, a fair and equitable one would be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. Plain City Irrigation Company v. Hooper Irrigation Company, 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P. 2d 625
(1960); Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69, 106 Pac.
945 (1910); Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129
Pac. 619 (1913); Continental Bank & Trust Company
v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890 (1955).
Even where the result is not harsh and unreasonable, but merely unlikely to have occurred under the circumstances, the Court will favor a more reasonable
construction. This principle was applied in the case of
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 U.
2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773 ( 1957). In that case, Bybee purchased carpets for his home from Adams. Bybee paid
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a portion of the purchase price in cash and a portion by
promissory note. Adams negotiated the note to C011 •
tinental Bank without recourse. Bybee had knowledge
of the transfer of the note. After installation, a separation appeared in the seams of the carpet. 13ybee
complained to Adams and the two compromised the defect. Adams paid 13yhee $100 and signerl an agreement
releasing Bybee from all further liability on the carpet.
\Vhen Continental Bank sued on the note, Bybee
filed a third party complaint against Adams alleging
that by reason of the settlement agreement, Adams
should hold him harmless from the note. The issue pre·
sented was whether the settlement agreement which re·
leased Bybee from all further obligation on the carpet
constituted an assumption by Adams of the note held
by the bank.
In deciding the intent of the parties, the comt
noted that it was not credible that Adams would be will·
ing to forgive the entire obligation and pay Bybee $100
in addition. This fact was considered in ascertaining the
intent of the parties.
In the instant case, if the letter is held to supersede
paragraph 2!J of the Lease, or is held to waive the Club's
right to reimbursement, the Club will be required to ex·
pend in excess of $16,000 to fulfill an obligation whicl'.
Lessor undertook at the time the Lease was executed. If
the letter is held to amend the Lease, it must follow that
the Club agreed to pay approximately $16,000 (R. 18)
to rent a small space situated outside the building and
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unsuited for any valuable use. In addition, such a holding further places maintenance of the air conditioning
system upon the Club when the Lease specifically provides otherwise. It is difficult to imagine the Club could
have agreed to such a plan. On the other hand, if the
trial court's holding is reversed, the situation is converted to the usual circumstance where a lessee cures a
breach of the lessor and is reimbursed by the lessor for
fulfilling his obligation.
In determining the intent of the parties to a contract, this court has also applied the rule that where
there are conflicting statements of intent, the first expression of intent governs. JJiuf fZin v. Shild, 77 Utah
mo, 293 Pac. 1 ( 1930). This is especially so when the
latest expression of intent is on an endorsement or other
document not physicially included in the contract. Ibid.
A pp lying this rule, the first expression of intent, the
Lease itself, governs over the later expression of intent,
the letter of July 23. This rule is particularly applicable
to the situation involved in this case since the letter was
not physically attached to the Lease.
One further point should be noted with regard to
the alleged amendment and waiver of paragraph 29.
Even if the Lease were amended to exclude paragraph
2!l, the Club had a common law right to reimbursement
independent of the provisions of the lease. Beardsley v.
Morrison, 18 Utah 478, 56 Pac. 303 (1899); lJtlarini v.
lre"land, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970); Rene's Restaurant
Corporation v. Fro-Du-Co. Corporation, 210 N.E. 2d
385 (Ind. 1965).
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Even if the letter of July 23 could he construed to
mean that the Club waived its rights under paragraph
29, or that the letter amended the Lease, the letter should
not be given effect on a summary judgment. There are
serious disputes as to material facts which must be resolved before the letter could be enforced.
As noted in the statement of facts, the Lessor gave
the appearance of cooperating with the Club in obtaining the replacement unit. During this period of coopera·
tion, there was no mention that the acquisition would
not he on the account of Lessor in accordance with the
Lease. llowever, after the unit was purchased, the
Lessor presented the letter of July 23 with the threat
that if the same was not signed they ·would not allow
the installation of the new unit. Apparently the Lessor
relented and the addendum was added reserving all
rights. These circumstances raise a factual issue as to
the existence of duress and summary judgment is there·
fore precluded.
The law is clear that if the letter was obtained
under circumstances which amount to duress, the terms
thereof are voidable. Fotv v. Pfrrcey, 11!) Utah 367, 227
P. 2d 763 ( 1951) ; State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153
P. 2d 647 (1944).
This court has adopted the following definition of
duress in Fox v. Piercey, supra:
"The tendency of the modern cases, and undoubtedly the correct rule is that any unlawful
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threats which do in fact overcome the will of
the person threatened, and induce him to do
an act which he tt•ould not otherwise have done ,
and which he was not bound to do, constitute
duress." (Emphasis added.)
In the Fox ca.Ye, this Court stated that the threatened breach of the contractual obligation or even a
wrongful act in the moral sense constitutes a "wrongful
act" within the meaning of the definition above quoted:
" ... Acts may be wrongful within the meaning of this rule though they are not criminal
or tortious or in violation of contractual
duty ... although the threat need not be criminal, tortious or in violation of contractual
duty, it must be at least wrongful in the moral
sense."
Some courts have gone further and allowed a party
to avoid a purported agreement on equitable principles
when there has been undue advantage or overreaching.
In Dittbrenner v. "JJfycrson, 167 P. 2d 15 (Colo. 1946),
the court held:
"W'henever a person is in pecuniary necessity
and distress, so that he would be likely to make
any undue sacrifice, and advantages taken of
such condition to obtain from him a conveyance
or contract which is unfair, made upon an inadequate consideration, and the like, even
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though there be no actual duress or threats,
equity may relieve defensively or affirmatively."
In the instant case, the facts establish or at least
raise a factual issue, that despite the Lessor's obliga·
tions under the lease, and despite its acquiescence in the
installati0n of the new unit for the Club, it denied
all duty after the unit had actually been purchased and
a situation of finaucial emergency and distress had been
created.
The granting of Lessor's motion for summary
judgment prevented the Club from submitting the issue
of duress to the trier of fact and therefore the summary
judgment should be reversed.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE RECORD TO DISlVIISS TIIE CLUB'S
CLAIM: OF UN JUST ENRICHl\lENT.
Regardless of the manner in which the Lease is
construed, the fact remains that prior to the letter agree·
ment of July 23, 1969, the Club expended in excess of
$16,000 in the performance of an obligation which was
the responsibility of Lessor. The performance by the
Club to the Lessor's obligation gives rise to a cause of
action for unjust enrichment.
A cause of action for unjust enrichment is created
when a person "has or retains money or benefits which
in justice and equity belong to another." Baugh v. Dar·
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lcy, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335 (19·:1!7) (Emphasis
added). Accord, Boroughs v. Peterson, 39 Utah 11, 114
Pac. 758 (1911); Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah
482, 118 Pac. 122 ( 1911).
It is clear that Lessor obtained the type of benefit
contemplated by the unjust enrichment cause of action.
The Restatement of Restitution, § 1, Comment b, provides:

"A person confers a benefit upon another if
he . . . satisfies a debt or duty of the other,
or in anyway adds to the other's security or advantage."
EYen if the lower court's decision as to the contractual issues is upheld, the cause of action for unjust enrichment should remain. Such a cause of action is available despite the existence of an agreement between the
same parties, regardless of the enforcability of such an
agreement. Baugh v. Darley, supra; Jensen v. JVhitesides, 13 U.2d 293, 370 P. 2d 765 (1962).
CONCLUSION
The rent abatement provisions are not exclusive
remedies but merely an attempt to reserve the contractual remedy not otherwise available at law. The reservation of this remedy could not preclude the Club's
remedies at law in the absence of specific provisions to
that effect.
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The exculpatory prov1s10ns of the lease must be
construed strictly against the Lessor, and when so construed said provisions do not release Lessor from
liability in this case.
The Club has spent considerable sums to cure
Lessor's admitted breach of the Lease and should be re·
imbursed in accordance with the Lease provisions. The
parties have never expressed an intent to in any way
alter the reimbursement provisions of the Lease, or at
least a factual dispute exists with regard to such intent.
The Club has expended over $16,000 for the bene·
fit of the Lessor and should be reimbursed for these
expenditures.
The University Club respectfully submits that
summary judgment rendered by the lower court should
be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court
for trial on all of the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
JONES, 'VALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
By ............................................................
H. R. Waldo, Jr.

By ··············································
Robert
McDonald

